Rid, T and P McBurney (2012) "Cyber-Weapons" The RUSI Journal, vol 157, iss 1, February, 6-13, DOI:10.1080/03071847.2012.664354
What are cyber-weapons? Instruments of code-borne attack span a wide spectrum, from generic but low-potential tools to specific but high-potential weaponry. This distinction brings into relief a two-pronged hypothesis that stands in stark contrast to some of the received wisdom on cyber-security. Maximising the destructive potential of a cyber-weapon is likely to come with a double effect: it will significantly increase the resources, intelligence and time required for development and deployment – and more destructive potential is likely to decrease the number of targets, the risk of collateral damage and the political utility of cyber-weapons.
In the days and hours leading up to the afternoon of 19 March 2011, air force planners in France, Britain, and several other NATO countries were frantically preparing an imminent bombing campaign against military targets in Libya. In Washington on that same March weekend an unusual discussion took place between the Department of Defense and the White House. Should America deploy its cyber arsenal against Libya’s air defence system? After the Pentagon’s generals and geeks had briefed the president on the options, he decided that, No, the time was not ripe for cyber weapons.
The behind-the-scenes episode is part of a much larger debate about offensive cyber weapons. […]
“Ansteckende Neugier,” Der Spiegel, 23/2012, p. 124
BBC Radio 5, 31 May 2012
RUSI podcast, 23 April 2012
“On Cyberwar Hype” Schneier on Security, 14 March 2012
“What are Cyber Weapons?” Infosec Island, 14 March 2012, reposted from Cyber Arms
Radio interview (7.47min), Monocle 24, 6 March 2012
“Why Anonymous will never be able to take down the power grid,” Jerry Brito, 27 February 2012
“The cyber-weapons paradox,” The Register, 24 February 2012