

## Razzia: A Turning Point in Modern Strategy

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*The razzia, a tactic of swift and brutal raids used by the French military against recalcitrant tribes in Algeria in the 1840s, was a necessary step in modern military thought. At first glance the destructive and violent razzias stand in stark contrast to the constructive and non-violent bureaux arabes—an institutional ancestor of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. But both were developed in the same conflict and by the same men. These two innovations, this article argues, were also flipsides of the same coin: what today is called war “among the people.” The razzia consequently appears as a necessary historic precursor for contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine.*

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Algiers in the 1840s was tantalizing. Seen from the deck of an approaching Alexandrian steamer, the “Pirate’s Daughter”—as contemporary travelers nicknamed the city—appeared like a triangular shape of chalk on a slope of green hills, the dark Atlas mountains rising menacingly in the distance behind. In 1837, just after the French had taken Algeria’s last Ottoman city in Constantine, it was the muezzin’s monotonous cry from a towering minaret that roused the traveler from his morning sleep. Such observed Thomas Campbell, a poet and one of the first Britons to describe Algeria after the French conquest. Ten years later, the sound that made sleep fragile in the mornings was the “irritating rattle of the regimental drums,” noted a later traveler from England.<sup>1</sup> A “lively masquerade” awaited European visitors: narrow streets winding steeply up the hills, more like staircases than roads, spilling into public squares with porcelain pavement, framed by pillars and arches and palm trees. There they found French women wearing white aprons and handkerchiefs, Minorcan laborers returning from lush gardens, dark-skinned Kabyles offering fresh fruits, Berbers with embroidered coats, Jewish dandies with blue turbans, dark-eyed girls with bright sashes, old men playing chess. As bewildering as the peculiar smells and sounds were military men in their harlequin uniforms: *zouaves*

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with red pantaloons and white jackets; *indigènes* with black instead of yellow gaiters; *spahis* with red jackets and blue pantaloons; *the chasseurs d'Afrique* mounted on formidable Arab horses.

It was alien territory that awaited Major General Carl von Decker, a military thinker who had taught under Clausewitz at the *Kriegsschule* in Berlin.<sup>2</sup> “Hopefully you left all your European ideas over there in Toulon,” a French officer greeted the Prussian general as he debarked from his vessel in Algiers.<sup>3</sup> Decker came to Africa to observe the ongoing French campaign against Abd el-Kader’s insurrection. But the study of European warfare and its history was of limited use on the Mediterranean’s southern shores. Decker soon discovered that the essential elements of war as he knew it were missing in Algeria: There were no enemy positions that could be attacked, no fortifications, no operationally relevant locations, no strategic deployments, no lines of communication, no army, no decisive battles—in a word: there was “no center of gravity,” he noted in a direct, puzzled hint at Clausewitz. “The finest gimmicks of our newest theoreticians of war lose their magic power [in Africa].”<sup>4</sup> One new element of war that baffled European observers was that territory could not be held. If a soldier “can’t even remain on the square-inch of land which he fought for with his own blood, then indeed the most sublime ‘Theory of Great War’ will be obsolete and one has... to come up with a new one,” Decker concluded.<sup>5</sup>

How did that new theory of war emerge? This article looks at the appearance of the first operational concept in modern expeditionary warfare that put the local population front and center: *la razzia*. It argues that the brutal raids were a necessary experience for modern military thinkers to recognize the role of the civilian population in what later would be called counterinsurgency operations. The *razzia* was the coarse prototype war “among the people.”<sup>6</sup> The argument is organized in four steps: it opens with an example of a *razzia*. Then it examines the raids’ conceptual and practical utility. Thirdly the *razzia*’s twin innovation is introduced, the *bureaux arabes*, a military system designed to interact with the friendly tribal population through non-violent means—the *razzia*’s bright side. Finally the dark side of the mid-19th century focus on the local population will be considered. The *razzia*, in its extreme form, raises an old question with continued relevance: is it, in the face of popular resistance, possible to reap the benefits of “population-centric” military action without paying the dire costs?

## A Razzia

In the 1830s the French armed forces adapted an ancient tactic of pre-Islamic Bedouin societies to their purposes of colonial warfare, the *ghaziya*, or raid. The Arabic word subsequently entered the European languages through transliteration as “*razzia*.”<sup>7</sup> A German dictionary of 1907 describes “*Razzia*” as a word of Arab origin designating a military raid against enemies or recalcitrant tribes that “came to us from Algeria.”<sup>8</sup> For Bedouin tribes the *ghaziya* had long been a way of life. In nomadic societies, wrote William Montgomery Watt, a leading scholar of Islamic studies, the *ghaziya* “might almost be described as the national sport.”<sup>9</sup> In expeditions tribes seized livestock, goods, and—more rarely—women from hostile tribes. The gist of a *razzia* was to attack with overwhelming force against unprepared herdsmen or settlements. Because resistance against such massive incursions was futile, the victims could flee without disgrace and without losing face—and eventually

reciprocate. Loss of life was rare, but more serious tribal wars that employed the same techniques could break out as well. The razzia was, in short, an ancient and primitive tactic of mobile desert warfare. "It was essentially from the light-hearted razzia," Montgomery Watt pointed out, "that the Islamic idea and practice of the jihad or holy war developed."<sup>10</sup> During Islam's expansion across North Africa, for instance, the razzia was used by the advancing Arabs to break the resistance of Algeria's Berbers. Many centuries later, the French army had a similar objective.

One of Algeria's most formidable warriors was Sherif Mohammad ben Abdallah, in influence and resources second only to Abd el-Kader, the Emir of Mascara and Algeria's highest authority. Abdallah's nom de guerre was Bou-Maza, the man with the goat. The young religious fanatic entered the scene late, in 1845, and reinforced the insurgency's religiously inspired character. The mountain tribe of the Beni-Hidja in the territory of Orléansville (today Chlef) had harbored and supported the Bou-Maza, who preached jihad against the occupiers and at one point had even attacked Orléansville, the territory's capital. Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, a veteran of Napoleon's Battle at Jena and the Spanish Peninsular War but also a member of parliament, had become Algeria's commander-in-chief in December 1840. Bugeaud, fearing holy war, was alerted by the Bou-Maza's inciting influence on the local tribes.<sup>11</sup> His supporters needed to be rebuked for harboring the insurgent leader and for questioning French authority. "The tribe of the Beni-Hidja deserves the most severe and exemplary punishment," Bugeaud had written to Colonel Armand de Saint-Arnaud, his energetic and determined subdivision commander of Orléansville, the largest city in the Dahra region. "Burn all their crop, cut their fruit trees; they shall be ruined for a long time," Bugeaud decreed.<sup>12</sup>

On January 21, 1846 Colonel de Saint-Arnaud instructed one of his subordinate commanders, Lieutenant Colonel François Canrobert, in charge of the 64th regiment of the line at Ténès, to attack. Canrobert's unit took position on the plateau of Tadjena, not far north of Orléansville, at one of the strategic outlooks overseeing the Dahra region, enabling the unit to attack both southward to Chélif or northward to the Mediterranean. An informant, most likely recruited by an indigenous affairs officer, had passed along the whereabouts of the Bou-Maza. The troublemaker was thought to be in a meeting with local tribal leaders. On January 26, at nine at night, Canrobert received the missing reconnaissance he had awaited so impatiently. A few hours later, at eleven-thirty, his men were up and armed. Five hundred elite grenadiers without knapsacks; the regular cavalry; and the *goum*, irregular indigenous horsemen, were ready to attack. The column advanced through the night in the most orderly fashion, in total silence, not a single pipe lit. At dawn, with the first gleam of light appearing at the horizon, forward observers were able to distinguish the tents in the valley, tucked into the mountains. The cavalry and the *goum* split and blocked the valley's exit, the only passage available to the population to be chased out by the infantry. Then the first *douars*—or villagers—cried alarm. Bullets were exchanged, the entire valley erupted in panic: "Women, men, children scurry to the only exit offered to them by the terrain, only to find the riflemen and the *goum*; salvoes whiz and the riflemen's sabers pierce a large number, and one hundred fifty corpses soon scatter the ground," reported one officer who participated in the raid.<sup>13</sup>

Although Canrobert's unit did not manage to catch the "man by the goat" that day, they took home with them prisoners, mostly women with their children, cattle, and foodstuffs. Such booty was not atypical. The razzias went beyond punishment.

The raids did not only produce the desired intimidation, the razzias had a logistic flipside. Lieutenant-Colonel de Montagnac highlighted another utility of the new tactic: "It solved," he explained, "the huge problem . . . to feed our soldiers in Africa without the need for those immense supply convoys."<sup>14</sup> One razzia in early May 1841 in which the new top commander, Bugeaud himself, participated, produced a rich "material success," as one Danish officer noted. Waldemar von Raaslöff, who served in the French army in Algeria for more than a year, counted 80 prisoners, 2,000 animals of cattle, chicken, honey, eggs, milk, butter, and a rich booty of garments and even jewelry.<sup>15</sup>

The conquest of Algeria took more than a quarter century. The undertaking was started by Charles X in 1830, and continued under the three succeeding regimes, the July monarchy (1830–1848), the Second Republic (1848–1852), and then the Second Empire. Until 1870 the colony remained under the responsibility of the ministry of war. Razzias started soon after the invasion, sometimes only to punish a tribe for crimes committed in its area of responsibility.<sup>16</sup> The forays became more and more common in the early 1840s and continued even after Abd el-Kader had surrendered in 1847. Edmond-Charles de Martimprey, a French general who was stationed in Oran, recounted in his memoirs well more than twenty-five raids he had participated in. During the winter of 1842/43, he noted wryly, "the razzias and the abductions [enlèvements] repeated themselves in all directions."<sup>17</sup> Raaslöff, a particularly keen observer, thought the raids were a "daily" procedure, although not all of them committed by the French but also by other tribes against allies of the occupying power.<sup>18</sup> Most military biographies of European officers and countless travel writers mention numerous French raids over an extended period of time, even well into the 20th century, until Morocco was eventually pacified in 1934, although the tactic was most frequently employed in the early 1840s.<sup>19</sup>

Mostly the number of casualties was low, but the booty significant: goods, grain, produce, livestock, horses, and prisoners, often women and children as the men were more difficult to come by. The military administration kept a smaller amount of the produce for itself, but mostly used the booty—and particularly the prisoners—as barter to pressure the tribe in question into submission. Yet the razzias were more than just "organized theft," as the press in Paris and in other European cities derided the practice. Many officers saw it as a necessary adaptation of tactics to the local environment. Bugeaud was probably inspired by his experiences in Catalonia during the Peninsular War, when his commander was Marshal Louis Gabriel Suchet. Bugeaud's Tafna expedition, which he undertook in 1836 during a first tour in Algeria as regional commander of French forces in Oran, foreshadowed the turn towards mobile columns. The general went off with 6,000 men for five weeks, from June 12 to July 19, a slightly longer marching tour than usual. Bugeaud confronted Abd el-Kader two times, decisively defeating his adversary's troops at Sikkak on July 6.<sup>20</sup> The commander had built himself a reputation with this victory. In 1837 he brokered a temporary peace with Abd el-Kader in the Tafna treaty, and eventually defeated organized resistance at Isly in 1844. Inaction after the conquest, Bugeaud thought, was not an option. "It is necessary to preserve agile columns, roaming the countryside and fighting the enemy wherever he presents himself, leaving him neither security nor rest," the ambitious general demanded in a memorandum he wrote after the Tafna expedition.<sup>21</sup> When Bugeaud took over as Algeria's top commander in December 1840, this aggressive type of marching expedition, launching razzias en route, would serve him as a model. The razzia was elevated to doctrine.

## A New Theory of War

The conceptual underpinnings of the razzia were developed and made explicit in 1840.<sup>22</sup> The situation in Algeria had been brittle, and only some coastal areas were under French control. The political class in Paris was concerned about the cumbersome military progress in the new colony. By the late 1830s, Bugeaud was lobbying in Paris to be the next governor-general of Algeria. And it slowly became visible that he combined at least three sets of expertise that would shape his military approach. Not only was he a famed military leader and veteran of several important campaigns. He was also a highly successful agrarian innovator and reformer in his civilian life in Perigord. And he was a politician who had been elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1831 as representative of the Dordogne, at a time when he had been promoted *maréchal de camp*, a rank equivalent to brigadier general. In fact Bugeaud maintained his seat in the Chamber throughout his military career, until 1847.

All these skills were on display when Bugeaud outlined what he would do in Algeria. On January 15, 1840 he spoke to the Chamber and forcefully argued the case for the razzia, rebuking liberal criticisms of such tactics. “These murmurs seem to mean that the Chamber finds these means too barbaric,” he began:

Gentlemen, you don't make war with philanthropic sentiments. If you want the end, you have to want the means. If there are no other means than those indicated, they have to be used. I would always prefer French interests to an absurd philanthropy for foreigners who behead our wounded soldiers and prisoners of war.<sup>23</sup>

When Bugeaud took command of Algeria in 1840, he had approximately 60,000 troops at his disposal, a number that surged to more than 100,000 in the following two years. His predecessors had tried various strategies and methods to crush resistance—with very limited success.

The political general discussed three options: abandonment, naval occupation, and a surge of troops to achieve what he called “absolute conquest.” Retreat and abandonment he excluded because there was no government in sight in Paris that was strong enough to try. Occupation from naval bases he excluded because it was impractical, security for a considerable numbers of settlers could not be guaranteed, and the Berber resistance would grow unchecked. Serious occupation remained as the only option. He intentionally had left out restricted occupation as an option, a clever omission that attests to the officer's political savvy. Yet recent events in the Mitidja plain forced him to condemn the present policy of restrained occupation forcefully in another speech on 14 May. A small footprint was a wrongheaded strategy to secure the country: it wouldn't help diminish enemy forces, it would tie the force into a defensive role in ill-defended military outposts, establish permanent inferiority, and therefore encourage the enemy's audacity. A small army, the proponents of conquest argued, would depend on the treasury's money; a large army, by contrast, would generate revenue by creating a secure environment for agriculture, trade, and the collection of taxes and tariffs. Finally it should not be underestimated how embarrassing a defeat against an “uncivilized” and backward African country would have been in Europe's cafés and salons.

The argument that followed can be seen as an indicator of an emerging new theory of war that under Bugeaud's command would take concrete shape in the fight against Algeria's tribes: "In Europe, Gentlemen, we don't just make war against armies; we make war against interests." He then outlined the contemporary understanding of war in Europe. War against European powers was as an act of force to affect the enemy's political entity and will, not just his army. "If we won against adversarial armies, we penetrate a country's interior and seize the centers of population, of commerce, of industry, the borders, the archives of government. And soon the interests are forced to capitulate." This view of war reflected the state of the art of strategic thinking in Europe. Clausewitz's *On War*, although the book was translated as *De la guerre* only in 1849, had spelled out that line of military thinking: breaking the adversary's will was the purpose of war, not breaking his armies. So-called "centers of gravity"—what Bugeaud called "interest"—were seen as the key to victory. But this way of war wouldn't work against an insurgency in Algeria, Bugeaud charged, now bringing to bear his agricultural background.

There are no equivalent interests to seize in Africa, or at least there's only one, the agricultural interest. And even that interest is much more difficult to seize in Africa than elsewhere, because there are neither villages nor farms. But nevertheless one sows grains, brings in the harvest, and there are pastures. . . . I couldn't discover any other seizable interest.<sup>24</sup>

In Europe talented military commanders would be able to accomplish great victories with small armies, he continued, perhaps hinting at Napoleon's impressive command, which he witnessed during the Hundred Days. "That's wrong in Africa, where you rarely find twelve or fifteen thousand Arabs united." In Africa, Bugeaud marveled, "the force is diffuse, it's everywhere." An army mentally and physically equipped for European war will therefore find itself in the position of a bull attacked by a multitude of wasps. "Interests" would be as difficult to seize as the adept horsemen of the *goum*. The general's conclusion was to emulate the adversary. "Only by diffusing oneself, if this expression may be allowed, can one deal with them."<sup>25</sup> So much for the theory.

The *razzia* converted these concepts into ruthless operational practice. Bugeaud's subordinates, those who executed and participated in *razzias*, equally highlighted the difference to the European way of war (as did visiting observers of both military and civilian background). "In Europe, once [you are] master of two or three large centers of industry and production, the entire country is yours," Pierre de Castellane outlined. "But in Africa, how can you impose your will on a population whose only link with the land is the pegs of their tents?"<sup>26</sup> For some officers trained in the use of force, the answer was straightforward. "There's only one means, the *razzia*, a *coup de main*, which hurls a force upon a population with the rapidity of a bird of prey, stripping it of its riches, its herds, its grains—the Arab's only vulnerability."<sup>27</sup> Other officers agreed and pointed out that livestock and grain, since they were the only seizable interests of the tribes, had the same operational importance and moral status as the occupation of cities in a European war.<sup>28</sup> "One has no other means than to take the grain which feeds them, the flocks which clothe them. Therefore the war on silos, the war on cattle, *la razzia*."<sup>29</sup> The raids were designed as a crude form of economic warfare.

These ideas were not limited to hardened French officers in Algeria. No lesser political commentator than Alexis de Tocqueville, already famous at the time for his writings on democracy in America, supported Bugeaud's argument. The writer and politician had visited Algeria and even took part in some expeditions as an observer.<sup>30</sup> "If we do not burn harvests in Europe, it is because in general we wage war on governments and not on populations," Tocqueville analyzed in an essay about Algeria and how to deal with Abd el-Kader's insurrection. If only soldiers are taken as prisoners in Europe, and not civilians, this is "because armies hold firm" and the population does not escape and diffuse after victory. "In a word," Tocqueville wrote, "it is because we can always find the means of seizing political power without attacking the governed or even making them supply resources necessary for war."<sup>31</sup> That, alas, was different in Africa, Tocqueville reasoned. And the only consequence, the "indispensable" instrument, were raids that seized what could be seized. From here it was only a small step to justify the razzia in the name of operational necessity. Tocqueville:

I believe that the right of war authorizes us to ravage the country and that we must do it, either by destroying harvests during the harvest season, or year-round by making those rapid incursions called razzias, whose purpose is to seize men or herds.<sup>32</sup>

Other European observers also agreed. Raaslöf, the general officer who observed the war for almost two years and later became the Danish minister to the United States during the Civil War and then Minister of War of Denmark, equally defended the new practice. New rules would apply in Algeria: "Where war is waged by armies that are specifically organized for that purpose, citizens can remain distant from the war, and continue their ordinary occupation." A country's resources, therefore, can be employed by the state. "It becomes possible to distinguish the peaceful citizen from the adversarial army and to protect the private property of the citizen against violent attacks and destruction," he argued. Yet if there is no such clear line between the population and a specialized armed profession, the rules need to be adapted: "The more popular a war becomes, the more the citizens of the state act as part of its army, using all available means and resources in support of one party, the less can it be expected that these resources should be spared by the other party"—to the contrary, Raaslöf also argued that the destruction of these resources can even become a "duty."<sup>33</sup> The war against resisting tribes was the logical corollary. "Because of the popular character of war in Africa, and because of the adversary's impressive mobility, the French have only one choice: to use the only effective system, the 'razzia.'" Raaslöf, after noting one razzia's material gains, highlights the immense "moral effect of a well-executed razzia," the news of which would travel "quickly across the entire country." Like Decker, the Clausewitz disciple, Raaslöf was convinced to witness "the transition to a new way of war, driven unmistakably by General Bugeaud's razzia."<sup>34</sup>

Not only the strategic rationale was new, the raids revealed novel operational requirements as well. "Combat in Germany or in Italy," wrote one officer from the Algerian province of Oran, "means fighting against men, against nations where humanity is a law." The wounded are secured, prisoners treated well, and once the battle is over, tired soldiers find shelter, places to rest, and sometimes even celebrations are encountered on the passage, "the pleasures will reanimate your ardor." Not

in Africa. Once battle commences, there's no more rest. "The enemy is invisible, he is everywhere," Count Pierre de Castellane wrote, a participant of several campaigns in the young colony.<sup>35</sup> In constant search for the enemy, French units were exposed to the desert's harsh climate as much as to the enemy's harsh tactics. Marching during the day, marching during the night, the troops were defying the morning's chilling dew, Algeria's remorseless sun during the day, "and icy rains, pouring down on you for entire weeks." To be mobile and faster, soldiers were stripped of excess baggage to a minimum, and often suffered from malnutrition during these long marching tours. Fatigue and exhaustion were pushed to an extreme. The army's physical health eroded.<sup>36</sup> Morale slumped; "to raise courage: nothing, absolutely nothing, always the same faces, always the isolation."

To employ the new way of war with the necessary energy and rigor, changes in the overall force structure were necessary. Before Bugeaud took command, three principal problems plagued the army. First his predecessors had built heavily fortified garrisons and blockhouses to fend off attacks—but these outposts were overmanned, they immobilized troops, and offered easy targets. A second problem were cumbersome columns, pinned down by wagons, heavy artillery, and excessive supplies—the luggage slowed down marches, limited the available routes, fatigued even the strongest soldiers, and made marches predictable for attackers. Third the living conditions: the quality of rations and water was low, bedding was insufficient, diarrhea and dehydration decimated the ranks during expeditions, hospitals were in a dismal condition, causing multiple suicides on each expedition. On June 16 Bugeaud wrote to the minister of war and outlined some necessary changes in force composition and logistics, such as a demand for more mules to increase mobility. Above all, Bugeaud complained about some of his senior commanders. He wanted hardened and energetic men of zest, both morally and physically tough. The colonels and battalion commanders who were "a little aged" did not do. Their vigor in spirit and heart would not support the mission, and Bugeaud demanded they be recalled to France. "Their presence here is much more of a nuisance than useful," he stressed. Instead he wanted as commanders "young men of ardor and future."<sup>37</sup> An energetic young army corresponded to the kind of war Bugeaud envisaged, in fact his aggressive style of war required younger leaders, willing to take risks and unwilling to ask too many questions.

By 1842 new successes for Bugeaud's rejuvenated army were visible, and Paris and Algiers were debating the new strategy's merits. The tribes' submissions were so numerous that some doubted that the French army's actions could explain the success, and argued that the same tribes would surrender just to save their harvest and, once that is achieved, would rejoin the insurgency. The *Moniteur algérien*, an official periodical, on July 4, 1842, published an article by "an officer of the *armée d'Afrique*." It highlighted the recent successes in suppressing the insurgency and praised many of the tactical innovations championed by Bugeaud.

We have found a more efficient way than burning crops: waging an incessant war which impacts the population through individuals and *in all their interests*. The flights, the continuous alarms, the enormous losses inflicted by the razzias and even by mere relocations, the women and children we captured; the old, the women, the children and the herds who perished from fatigue and hunger; the necessity to live the entire winter in the harshest mountains, on summits covered with snow—that is what for better or worse pushed the Arabs into submission.<sup>38</sup>

## The Bright Side

Yet it would be a mistake to assume that the French high command had merely been interested in crushing insurgents along with the local population without distinction. Far from it. Already in 1837, Bugeaud had well understood the crucial role of the friendly population. And he also understood the difficulty of distinguishing between friend and foe. Three years before he would take command of the country's colonization, he had already reflected upon the political nature of the undertaking. Perhaps that was not surprising for a man who, although an ardent Royalist, was elected into office several times. Since 1834, Bugeaud analyses in his *Œuvres militaires*, Abd el-Kader had made constant efforts to separate the French army from the population. Trade and economic relations stood in the center of the marshal's thinking. "[Abd el-Kader] understood admirably well that the populations, in direct and free relations to us, would find such advantages in this exchange, that this interest would soon wither the political and religious passions, that the hatred would weaken in the frequent contact, and that he would lose his influence and his power."<sup>39</sup> The more the Emir attempted to drive a wedge between the locals and the occupier, the more the French army tried to enter into direct relations with the indigenous populations—sometimes to the dismay of the European settlers in Algeria. Bugeaud consistently emphasized the power of trade and free commerce that would eventually win over the indigenous Berbers and Arabs and "attach" them to the French authority. "Man doesn't stay indifferent to wellbeing," he said. When he took command of Algeria as governor-general, the 56-year-old general understood well that the endeavor would come with hefty costs. He called for large numbers of troops and supplemental funding. "To govern the people, to protect at the same time their interests and ours, a more forceful effort is perhaps needed, more determination, more vigor, than it would need to just win."<sup>40</sup> A new method of war, Bugeaud understood, could not only rely on destruction and deterrence—it needed a more constructive element, an attraction, an incentive.

The *bureaux arabes* were designed to be that constructive element. "The institution," wrote a former commander of one such bureau, Ferdinand Hugonnet, in 1858, was "not comparable with anything of the past."<sup>41</sup> The setup of the institution was subject to changes from the 1830s to the late 1860s.<sup>42</sup> In order to better understand the bureaus' role, it is necessary to see them in the context of the colony's general administrative setup. The *bureaux arabes* predated Bugeaud. General Avizard initiated them during his short stint as governor-general, from March 4 to April 19, 1833.<sup>43</sup> General Camille Alphonse Trézel, Avizard's chief of staff, came up with the initiative in order to extend and improve the army's tribal relations. Before indigenous affairs became an established professional career track for officers, local interpreters filled that operational niche. The head of such a *bureau arabe* had to know Arab affairs in his area of responsibility, inform the governor, and transmit official communication. The chief of the first *bureau arabe* was Captain Christophe de Lamoricière, an ambitious 27-year-old Arabic speaker and "African" of the first hour who knew the country "marvelously well," as Tocqueville observed.<sup>44</sup> He started his first bureau with four interpreters, several assistants, and additional indigenous employees. Thanks to his linguistic skills, the young officer was able to supervise and control the translators who often were Levantine Christians hostile to Muslims. The captain did the opposite of what had been done before: "Instead of roughening up the locals, he treated them justly," one civil servant observed.<sup>45</sup> Or,

in his own words, he was in charge of “all diplomatic affairs” with the country’s people. Not without sarcasm, he noted:

The place for the sessions of our congress was the trunk of a palm-tree in the Mitidja [a region south of Algiers]. Everybody goes there armed to their teeth, then the negotiators are charged to execute the resolutions that the assembly adopted. All these things play out in our theater are quite interesting, quite poetic and always full of originality. The more I understand the more efficient can I act on the Arab civilization, it interests me, makes me support the métier, it is physically and morally quite demanding what I’m responsible for.<sup>46</sup>

The institution initially was a great success. When Lamoricière, impulsive and outstanding on horseback—something that had gained him prestige among the locals—was promoted into another position, the future of the institution was unclear. The organization was temporarily abolished in November 1834, and several attempts were made to reorganize Arab affairs. No satisfactory system, however, was found. That changed with the arrival of Bugeaud. On August 16, 1841, eight months after he arrived in Algiers, the general reorganized the Arab affairs branch. Eugène Dumas was appointed *directeur des affaires arabes* and endowed with jurisdiction over the *ka’ids*, *sheiks*, *hakems*, *cadis*, *muphtis*, and all other indigenous authorities. He was tasked to establish relations with tribes both under French authority and independent, to “explain French policy and operations,” but also to transmit information to the various intelligence services upon request.<sup>47</sup>

The setup of the *bureaux arabes* attempted to emulate the local tribal structures. To administer the tribes efficiently it was necessary to understand the local social and political dynamics. Bugeaud was convinced that the new government system had to respect those dynamics. The French, he thought, had to work with established forms of authority and traditions. Military leaders slowly understood that more civil methods were in France’s interest when working with cooperative tribes and populations. “Good policy demands that for secondary jobs, we should have Arabs administering Arabs, with the French provincial and subdivision commanders in a supervising role,” Bugeaud argued.<sup>48</sup> At the same time, French commanders reasoned, it served their purpose to get the local leaders to “respect those that they administer.”<sup>49</sup>

But how did indigenous affairs relate to the *razzia*? The *bureaux arabes*, at first glance, contrasted starkly with the *razzia*. A genuinely positive and constructive institution—essentially an early setup to smooth civil-military relations in a tribal social environment—they seemingly could not have been invented by the same army, even the same commanders, who had elevated the *razzia* to operational doctrine. Indeed all major historical studies of the *bureaux arabes* almost entirely ignore the brutal raids and treat the bureaus as a separate entity.<sup>50</sup> But the *bureaux arabes* in fact made the *razzia* more efficient by serving two important military functions: they controlled crucial information and a powerful weapon.

First there was intelligence collection. The Arab bureaus became increasingly well embedded in local judicial procedures, as the cultural knowledge and the language skills of Arab affairs officers improved. It was only logical that the institution soon became a highly efficient instrument of intelligence collection. The indigenous affairs staff was officially instructed to provide “surveillance of the markets” and to file reports to the general government “on the country’s general political and

administrative situation.”<sup>51</sup> The surveillance of mosques and religious confraternities was seen as increasingly important, as commanders constantly feared the specter of holy war. Consequently, the officers in charge “must understand and speak the idiom of the indigenous people and they have to acquire a profound knowledge of the country through the study of established customs, the laws in force, etc.” Bugeaud:

The active and intelligent surveillance of indigenous leaders is a delicate task, reserved for the officer in charge of Arab affairs. To make it a success, he shouldn't hesitate by any means to put himself often among the populations: visit the markets, the tribes, and listen to the local's complaints.<sup>52</sup>

The Arab affairs officers were instructed to remain neutral. By not associating themselves with any particular violent faction, commanders hoped to portray France as a protector of the oppressed. Commanders hoped to be able to project this benevolent image into the most remote *douar*.<sup>53</sup> But often the officers were the only persons who would have information about a tribe's political loyalties—they therefore played an important role in deciding if a tribe should be punished with a razzia or not. The indigenous affairs branch was explicitly responsible for transmitting relevant information to the various intelligence services upon request.<sup>54</sup>

Second, the *bureaux arabes* controlled the *goum*, the indigenous cavalry described in the initial razzia. A *goum* usually was between around 50 up to more than 600 riders strong. When a tribe submitted to French rule and started to be administered by a bureau, the French officers began recruiting the irregular horsemen, called *goum* or *maghzen*. The irregular units were commanded by Arab commanders, and it was part of the indigenous affairs officers' responsibility to find men who were trustworthy. The *United Services Magazine*, for instance, reported that the *bureau arabe* in Aumale had command over a 600-strong *goum* in 1852.<sup>55</sup> The indigenous horsemen had a reputation for toughness and high physical endurance even under the desert's harsh conditions; “horses and riders deliver services we couldn't ask from our own cavalry,” wrote one French officer.<sup>56</sup> But the horsemen were also known for their fragile discipline and their ruthlessness. The cavalry was used for policing functions in peaceful areas. Hugonnet, himself the chief of a *bureau arabe*, described the attraction for young officers. “Goums, combat, razzias—these magic expressions that put such a powerful spell on the imaginations of young troops of Algeria—they represent a new order of ideas; new for the army's leaders, designed to seduce them.”<sup>57</sup> The *goum*, as well as the razzias, remained associated with the *bureaux arabes* over decades. As a result they were absorbing resources that could have been used more productively in a more sophisticated Arab affairs branch. Hubert Lyautey, later one of France's most successful colonial officers, had well recognized this flaw in the system. “One of the worst defects” in the management of the tribal areas, he reasoned, was “that goum and makhzens depend on the Indigenous Affairs,” and regular cavalry or infantry officers could not just be dispatched to command them. The *bureaux arabes*—“these essential administrative bodies,” as Lyautey saw it<sup>58</sup>—would not have the necessary number of officers to properly train and lead the indigenous cavalry.

Indigenous affairs, in other words, remained closely intertwined with the deterrence and punishment in these irregular campaigns. The Arabic-speaking

Lamoricière, the first head of Arab affairs, not only “loved Africa,” as Tocqueville observed, but also could have “an extreme disdain for human life.”<sup>59</sup> Lyautey also praised the *goum*, and noted that he used the cavalry intensively. Yet the marshal and proconsul cautioned: the indigenous units were “very capable of discipline if not cohesion, always devoted and loyal, brave under fire, [but] they demand to be bridled, particularly if *razzia* is in the air.”<sup>60</sup>

### The Dark Side

The *razzia*, supplied with targets and forces also by the bureaux arabes, always walked a fine line between benefits and costs, and eventually slid down a slippery slope on the cost side. These costs were of a moral, political, institutional, and operational nature. The slow moral corrosion of the force stands out as a first and alarming example. As often, the bluntest accounts come from outside observers. Dawson Borrer, a well-known English travel writer and journalist, went to Algiers and solicited the permission from Bugeaud to join one of his expeditions against tribes in the Kabylie. Borrer, who stayed in the colony for seventeen months, later published his journals in a much-reviewed book.<sup>61</sup> The reports of this early embedded journalist of one particular *razzia*, where Bugeaud himself was present, are exceptionally graphic and deserve to be quoted at length. After having raided and pillaged several villages already, Borrer’s column, with filled stomachs, was getting ready to storm the vicinity’s only remaining *douar*. The tents were tucked into a hill and somewhat elevated:

It being out of the question for the cavalry to mount the height, and the attempt being moreover perfectly unnecessary, they remained where they were, and three small columns of infantry, composed of the Zouaves, the Chasseurs d’Orleans, and the ‘Tirailleurs Indigènes,’ were led to the attack. The defence made here was more obstinate than in the former villages; for this was the forlorn hope of the enemy; this was the point whither the fugitives had fled, and the only place of refuge left for their wives and families. Congreves hissed through the air, and burst over the doomed stronghold, doing considerable execution; yet did the defenders pour down from the terraces of their houses an incessant fire upon the ascending troops, who advanced, however, with the utmost intrepidity, throwing forward clouds of skirmishers, firing in return as best they could, and toiling onward perseveringly towards the summit, though frequently obliged to use both hands and knees in their progress. One Zouave, whom I happened to be remarking, zealously labouring upwards to the attack, received a ball, apparently in his head; for, leaping from the ground, he fell over backwards, and made a series of somersaults down the ascent into a ravine below. . . . Finding their enemies rapidly gaining the height, and that one detachment was upon the point of taking them in the flank, the Kabaïles might now be seen retreating in stem despair from the village, turning and firing at intervals as they retired to the heights beyond. Two or three of the soldiers, mounting to this attack, fell dead struck by no bail. Desperate exertion and intense heat had killed them. The summit once attained, however, the lust of plunder gave strength to the troops; and dashing over the walls and through the

gateways, the scenes which had taken place in the villages below were again acted over, but with increased attendant horrors; for was it not the refuge of the women and the aged? Ravished, murdered, burnt, hardly a child escaped to tell the tale. A few of the women fled to the ravines around the village; but troops swept the brushwood; and the stript and mangled bodies of females might there be seen.<sup>62</sup>

Borrer's reportage is particularly lucid if compared to the written accounts of French soldiers, and the raid he described might have been particularly brutal. Yet razzias were common, violent, and some involved pillaging and abuse on a major scale. Regimental histories of the 1840s document a terrifying frequency of razzias against villages and tribes.<sup>63</sup> Even letters of officers occasionally portray the brutal and cruel behavior of their troops whom they were sometimes unwilling, sometimes unable, to stop. Years after the razzia described earlier in this article, Canrobert expressed his concern to Pierre de Castellane about the "disastrous effects of that terrible and barbarous instrument." He observed a "profound degeneration of morals that seizes the heart of a soldier who slits throats (*égorge*), steals, rapes and then brawls about his own booty, in front of officers often powerless to hold him back."

The Dahra affair and its aftermath illustrate the political costs of the razzia. On June 19, 1845, Colonel Aimable Pélissier raided an insurgent tribe in coastal mountains by Orléansville that allegedly had supported Bou-Maza, the tribe of the Ouled-Rhia. The raid took place not far from the one initially described, in the Dahra region, a large plain stretching between Ténès and Orléansville scattered by summits. The mountain range contains some immense caves, which were traditionally used by local Arabs who believed the shelters offered mythical protection.<sup>64</sup> When the French troops under Pélissier's leadership approached, the local families with their women, children, and their herds fled into the caves. Armed and supplied, they felt safe in the fortress-like perimeter. The French tried negotiation by using locally recruited troops as intermediaries. The besieged killed the first two that were sent in to talk them out. When the tribe shot even the third emissary, the soldiers outside could hear the agonizing cries of their comrade. Pélissier considered a retreat, but his men and their commanders were agitated. A charge into the cave would have resulted in heavy losses; and as Pélissier's column was part of a larger operation, time was too precious to simply wait them out.<sup>65</sup> He ordered to cut wood, bind bunches mixed with straw, and position them in front of the entrance to the three caves. When the desperate tribesmen, knowing what would come, tried to pull back the brushwood, snipers would open fire. "After several of the unlucky were killed," one French eye-witness reported, "and the entrance had been blocked by bunches of timber, we threw kindled sheaves to illuminate that immense pyre. The day of the 18th was used to nourish this kiln."<sup>66</sup> On the following morning, the cries of humans and animals alike and the continuous gunshot emanating from the cave had ceased. When the first troops went in to explore the cave, they found nearly 600 suffocated corpses, women clasped to their children, animals decomposing in the simmering heat.

The horrid details of that particular razzia—unlike those of many others—were included in Pélissier's report. When the document reached Algiers, Bugeaud was not present to prevent it from being forwarded to Paris. There the minister of war, Nicolas Jean de Dieu Sault, himself a decorated war hero but not on good terms with Bugeaud, released the statement to the Chamber of Peers and thus to the public.

The *razzia*, needless to say, never had the same prestige in Paris as it had in Algeria. Yet after Pélissier's slaughter became known, Paris was outraged by its army's cruelty. The press reported about the French barbarism rampant in Africa: "Have not we, a civilized people, given to our barbarian adversaries the example of barbarism? . . . When will the chiefs of our Army of Africa comprehend that their mission is to subdue the population of that country, and not to sweep it from the face of the earth?" soothed the editorial page of the *Courrier Français*, a liberal daily, after the incident and a subsequent escalation of violence. The *Courrier* and other influential papers called for Bugeaud's and Pélissier's dismissal. Writers and intellectuals were equally outraged: "Step by step, slipping down the nasty slope that so quickly degenerates civilized man back into the barbarian condition, our soldiers adopted Arab attitudes," wrote an influential historian and ardent proponent of colonization at the time, Paul Gaffarel.<sup>67</sup> But most importantly parliamentarians criticized the *razzia* in no ambiguous terms. Charles de Montalembert, a prominent publicist, condemned the events in the Chamber of Peers on June 30:

I say that the laws of humanity and the laws of honor are necessary for the glory of our army, and those laws are impaired, seriously impaired, by the system of *razzias* and organized devastation which we have been following up to this day.<sup>68</sup>

Other critics surmised that the aggressiveness of Algeria's campaigns might be the result of overambitious young commanders aspiring to make themselves a reputation, earn decorations, and get promoted more quickly. The outrage and the political damage was not limited to France, but engrossed all of Europe. Pillaging and raping French soldiers were a constant theme in contemporary travel reports, editorials, and even theater plays. Foreign witnesses described ghastly details in many languages, thus tarnishing the French army across Europe. After taking hostages during the raids, one Prussian traveler scoffed, "delightful Frenchmen" would "try a dance with the brown beauties" who, in an attempt to deter the marauders, "often covered their face with cow's dung."<sup>69</sup> Other writers ridiculed French generals for sincerely calling the raids "campaigns" and for reporting these "victories" against civilians back to Paris.<sup>70</sup> The German philosopher Immanuel Hermann Fichte, son of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, demanded in a comprehensive tract on ethics that "modern history should brand the 'razzias' of the French in Algiers with repugnance."<sup>71</sup> Across Europe, the moral grandstanding of France and the reputation of the French army was marred more and more.

A gap, already large, further opened between the Armée d'Afrique and Paris. The metropolitan reaction was met with disbelief by the military leadership in Algeria. The governor-general argued that any "loyal soldier" would have acted as his colonel did in Dahra, and that he in fact had ordered him to resort to such violence if necessary.<sup>72</sup> Other flag officers supported their fellow commanders. If in a similar position, "every one of us would have done the same as Pélissier," wrote Canrobert.<sup>73</sup> A fellow colonel with an equally aggressive reputation, Saint-Arnaud, pronounced himself "disgusted" and "shocked," as he made clear in a letter to his family:

How now! Here we are in Africa, ruining our health, risking our lives, working for the glory of France, and the most uninformed observer

can insult us and slander our intentions, imputing to us criminal feelings which are not of this century and which cannot belong to a soldier.<sup>74</sup>

Yet Bugeaud's defense of a long-serving fellow officer against the attacks of ignorant "philanthropists" from decadent Paris went beyond the praise for his loyalty and professional determination. The high command in Algeria took issue with a new kind of war that was just not properly understood back home in Paris. "Very few people in France," the general argued, were "capable of understanding the cruel necessities of total war." In a more primitive tribal environment, where tangible and "seizable" interests were missing, this line of strategic reasoning made even such extreme atrocities appear justified. "From the point of view of benevolence," Bugeaud explained in the *Moniteur algérien* on July 15, 1845, it was important to set an example for the future. The truly counterproductive thing Pélissier could have done would have been ordering a retreat. "The political consequences [of such action] would have been fatal," Bugeaud argued in the *Moniteur*. The message to all other tribes would have been that the caves are safe sanctuary. Indecisiveness and moderation would thus inevitably encourage future revolts. The objective therefore had been to destroy the tribes' confidence in caves and to break their morale. "The disastrous episode of the caves will prevent the shedding of much blood in the future," Bugeaud reasoned.<sup>75</sup> A month later the governor-general reissued orders to incinerate Muslims who refuse to abandon their caves. On August 8, Saint-Arnaud trapped the tribe of the Sbéah in a cave system; when the tribesmen refused to surrender, he had all entry points permanently sealed with solid rocks. The technique continued to be employed.

But even operationally the razzia's costs threatened to outweigh its benefits. Some highlighted it as an effective deterrent: "It is enough to mention the Maguerittes, Du Pins, and Beauprêtres," one French commander wrote the *Revue tunisienne*, referring to French officers known for their fierceness. "The punishment followed close to the revolt, and that has avoided insurrections well."<sup>76</sup> But this assessment was not quite correct. The Dahra massacre would fan the flames of hatred for decades to come to an extent that perhaps degraded Bugeaud's vision of commerce's unifying effect to a mere idealism and the same kind of "philanthropy" that he ridiculed among his opponents and critics in the Chamber. Bou-Maza's reinvigorated insurrection is a case in point. "The whole of the tribes in Algeria rose in insurrection," reported the *Annual Register* at the end of 1845. Abd el-Kader's resistance was reenergized. The fierce colonel Montagnac—who had boasted that he would give the "stupid philanthropists" in Paris something to "shout about" if in a similar situation<sup>77</sup>—was deceived by a local chief in the area of Djemma-Ghazaouat, where he and a large column ran into a ruse. All but fourteen of Montagnac's 450 troops were killed in the two-day battle.<sup>78</sup> And the enduring and extreme violence pushed the local Muslims to cast the conflict in Manichaean terms. The French authorities at one point captured and interrogated Bou-Maza's brother, whom they initially mistook for the insurgent leader himself. He was questioned in front of a jury: "What is it that the revolting tribes blame us for: the excesses, the thefts, the injustices, the crimes? Don't be afraid and say the truth," one of the judges asked. "Nothing of all that," the detainee responded. "The Arabs detest you because you have not the same religion as they do, because you are foreigners, because you seize their land today, and tomorrow you will ask for their virgins and children," he told his captors. "They are saying to my brother: guard us. Start the war. Each day that passes helps

the Christians.”<sup>79</sup> One of the best experts of Arab society at the time, General Eugène Daumas, “friend” of Abd el-Kader, head of the first *bureau arabe*, and a fluent Arab speaker, pointed out the predominant view of the occupation among the tribes in Algeria in the 1850s:

Unfortunately for us, the Arabs are convinced—from the last rider to the most powerful chieftain, all of them—that be it sooner or be it later, we will leave their country. Our presence is seen as a punishment for their sins, imposed on them by God.<sup>80</sup>

It turned out to be later.

### **The Best of Both?**

Both the *razzia*, first, and then the *bureaux arabes*, were military activities centered on the population. The raids punished uncooperative tribes while the indigenous affairs officers rewarded cooperative ones—for those yet undecided, the *razzia* was meant to deter while the bureaus, designed to increase security and prosperity, provided an incentive. The two Algerian innovations can thus be seen as coarse prototypes of modern population-centric expeditionary operations, prototypes of a bright and a dark side of counterinsurgency warfare. But the drastic and controversial tactics consequently raised a momentous question, a question that is amplified by both the subsequent history of the indigenous affairs branch as a discipline of the French army<sup>81</sup>—and ultimately by today’s counterinsurgency operations with their focus on the population: is it possible to have the benefit without the costs when using the armed forces against popular insurrections? Is it possible, metaphorically speaking, to void the *razzia* and keep the *bureaux arabes*? The tension between the two poles has defined the French army for much of its history. Even in the twenty-first century, that old question has lost neither significance nor actuality.

Two considerations weigh down on any answer to this question. The first has to do with the population, the second with the use of force. In any popular rising, it will be essential to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, between the neutral civilians and those who chose violent resistance. But guerrillas, insurgents, terrorists, or mujahidin—they all skillfully hide “among the people.” Identifying the foes without alienating friends is an eminently political undertaking. And giving essentially political tasks to officers who are trained to be apolitical might bring unwanted consequences. Focusing military action on the local population for a protracted period might turn an army into a more politically adept force.

Even more fundamental is the question of the use of force. Carl von Clausewitz, perhaps the most influential military thinker of the modern era, famously described military action as “an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will.” Samuel Huntington, in his 1957 classic *The Soldier and the State*, concisely outlined the history of the officer corps in Western democracies and modern armed forces as a progressing division of labor, characterized by an increasing professionalization of officers as specialists in the management of violence. For Huntington, a pivotal starting point was the Prussian Army Reform in the years after 1807, the same set of reforms that gave rise to Clausewitz’s thinking on the nature of conventional warfare and the use of military force. “War is the continuation of politics by other means,” Clausewitz famously said. If it would be possible, through a sophisticated

counterinsurgency strategy, to abandon the use of military violence over a protracted period of time and focus the armed forces on civil administration where the ideal ceases to be the specialized management of violence, then a 200-year old trend might end. War, then, would be the continuation of politics by the same means. Focusing military action on the population for decades might indeed lead an army down a slippery slope: towards becoming a less militarily adept force, mired in moral quandaries.

## Notes

1. Anonymous, "French Algeria," *Quarterly Review* 99 (1856): 331–371, 334. The following details are taken from this travel report. For a good visual representation of the city, see Théodore Müller's lithograph, after a daguerreotype by F. Geay, ca 1845, Algiers. Research Library, The Getty Research Institute, Los Angeles (acc #2003.R.6; 98.R.19; 2007.PR.101)

2. For details of their relationship see Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 313–314.

3. Decker recounted the anecdote in the introduction to his book, Carl von Decker, *Algerien und die dortige Kriegsführung* (Berlin: Friedrich August Herbig, 1844), 160–162.

4. *Ibid.*, 162.

5. *Ibid.*, 162.

6. U.S. Army, *Operations*, FM 3-0, 2008, 1–4. The phrase originally was introduced by Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force* (London: Penguin, 2006).

7. Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 74. Lewis only mentions the French use of the razzia in one brief paragraph.

8. Hermann Julius Meyer, *Meyers Großes Konversations-Lexikon* (Leipzig and Vienna: Bibliographisches Institut, 1907), 644–645.

9. William Montgomery Watt, "Islamic Conceptions of the Holy War," in Thomas Patrick Murphy, ed., *The Holy War* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976), 141–156, 141. Watt does not look at the modern use of the razzia.

10. *Ibid.*, 142.

11. Jacques Frémeaux, *Les Bureaux arabes dans l'Algérie de la conquête* (Paris: Denoël, 1993), 114–117; for an excellent contemporary treatment of the insurrection see the work of a former chief of a *bureau arabe*, Charles Richard, *Etude sur l'insurrection du Dahra* (Alger: A. Besancenez, 1846).

12. H. Ideville, *Le Maréchal Bugeaud, d'après sa correspondance intime et des documents inédites 1784–1849*, III vols, vol. III (Paris, 1882).

13. Louis Charles Pierre de Castellane, *Souvenirs de la vie militaire en Afrique* (Paris: Victor Lecou, 1852), 146–149.

14. An excellent history of the *Armée d'Afrique* is in Charles-André Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, vol. 1 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 316.

15. Waldemar Rudolph von Raaslöf, *Rückblick auf die militairischen und politischen Verhältnisse der Algérie in den Jahren 1840 und 1841* (Altona: J. Fr. Hammerich, 1845), 398.

16. For an example of such an early raid (1832), see C. Bamberg, *Aus Afrika und Spanien. Erlebnisse und Schilderungen* (Jena: Mauke, 1870), 172–175.

17. Edmond-Charles de Martimprey, *Souvenirs d'un officier d'état-major* (Paris: Quantin, 1886), 133.

18. Raaslöf (see note 15 above), 315.

19. There are too many examples to name here. The following books provide first-hand narratives: Ferdinand Hugonnet, *Souvenirs d'un chef de bureau arabe* (Paris: Michel Lévy frères, 1858); Martimprey, *Souvenirs d'un officier d'état-major*; Auguste Ducat, *La guerre en Afrique* (Paris: Dumaine, 1846); J.J. Clamageran, *L'Algérie : impressions de voyage (17 mars - 4 juin 1873)* (Paris: Germer Baillièrre, 1874); Dawson Borrer, *Narrative of a Campaign Against the Kabaites of Algeria* (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1848); Raaslöf (see note 15 above); Decker (see note 3 above); Richard (see note 11 above); Friedrich Heinzlmann, *Reisen in Afrika* (Leipzig: Fleischer, 1852); A. Bussière, "Le Maréchal Bugeaud et la Colonisation de l'Algérie," *Revue des Deux Mondes* (November 1853): 449–506; Lewis

Wingfield, *Under the Palms in Algeria and Tunis*, vol. 1 (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1868); Bamberg (see note 16 above).

20. Decker (see note 3 above), 198; H. Ideville, *Le Maréchal Bugeaud, d'après sa correspondance intime et des documents inédites 1784–1849*, III vols, vol. II (Paris, 1882), 47.

21. Ideville, *Le Maréchal Bugeaud (II)*, 47.

22. Among the very few twentieth century studies that even mention the “razzia” in passing, two homonymous articles stand out: Jean Gottmann, “Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare,” in Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943), 234–259; and Douglas Porch, “Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare,” in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 376–407. See also Douglas Porch, *The French Foreign Legion* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1992), 81–84. On the French colonial army in context, see Douglas Porch, *The March to the Marne: The French Army 1871–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 134–168.

23. Speech, 15 January 1840, Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, and Paul Azan, *Par l'épée et par la charrue : écrits et discours* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1948), 67–68.

24. *Ibid.*, 66.

25. *Ibid.*, 125.

26. Castellane (see note 13 above), 338; 229.

27. *Ibid.*, 338.

28. Hugonnet (see note 19 above), 208.

29. Castellane (see note 13 above), 229.

30. Melvin Richter, “Tocqueville on Algeria,” *The Review of Politics* 25, no. 3 (July 1962): 362–398.

31. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Writings on Empire and Slavery*, edited by Jennifer Pitts (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 70.

32. *Ibid.*, 71.

33. Raaslöff (see note 15 above), 314.

34. *Ibid.*, 398 footnote.

35. Castellane, the son of a better known marshal with the same name, published two volumes on his time in Algeria, “related in a spirited and lively manner, with, perhaps, a little French exaggeration, but certainly with much effect,” one reviewer wrote in *Colburn's United Service Magazine*, an annual British military journal, in 1853, 452.

36. See the report in a German journal for military doctors on Algeria, “III. Miscelle,” *Allgemeine Zeitung für Militair-Ärzte*, 1847, 24.

37. Ideville, *Le Maréchal Bugeaud (II)* (see note 20 above), 24.

38. *Ibid.*, 346.

39. Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, *Œuvres militaires* (Paris: Librairie militaire de L Baudoin, 1883), 313.

40. *Ibid.*, 314.

41. Hugonnet (see note 19 above), 5.

42. On the institution's continuity, spanning more than a century, see Vincent Monteil, “Les Bureaux arabes au Maghreb (1833–1961),” *Esprit* 29, no. 300 (November 1961): 575–606. On the SAS, see Grégor Mathias, *Les Sections administratives spécialisées en Algérie: entre idéal et réalité (1955–1962)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998).

43. Decker (see note 3 above), 184.

44. Frémeaux (see note 11 above). Julien (see note 14 above), 332. Tocqueville (see note 31 above), 80, footnote.

45. Achille Fillias, *Histoire de la conquête et de la colonisation de l'Algérie (1830–1860)* (Paris: Arnaud de Vresse, 1860), 136. Fillias, who temporarily lived and worked in Algeria as a civilian official, wrote numerous important works on Algeria.

46. Lamoricière quoted in Albert Ringel, *Les bureaux arabes de Bugeaud et les cercles militaires de Galliéni* (Paris: E. Larose, 1903), 19–20.

47. Arrêté du gouverneur général, 16 August 1841, reproduced in *Ibid.*, 24.

48. Bugeaud, quoted in *Ibid.*, 27–28.

49. Bugeaud, quoted in *Ibid.*, 28.

50. M. Boucherie, "Les bureaux arabes: leur rôle dans la conquête de l'Algérie," *Défense nationale*, no. 7 (July 1957): 1057–1066; Victor Foucher, "Les Bureaux arabes en Algérie," *Revue contemporaine* 34 (31 October 1857); Frémeaux (see note 11 above); Monteil (see note 42 above); Ringel (see note 46 above); Xavier Yacono, *Les bureaux arabes et l'évolution des genres de vie indigènes dans l'ouest du Tell algérois (Dahra, Chélif, Ouarsenis, Sersou)* (Paris: Larose, 1953).
51. Arrêté ministériel, 1 February 1844, *Bulletins officiels*, t. III, 21–22, reproduced in Frémeaux (see note 11 above), 288; see also Albert de Broglie, "Une réforme administrative en Afrique, II," *Revue des Deux Mondes* 25, no. 1 (1 January 1860): 295–335, 300.
52. Ideville, *Le Maréchal Bugeaud (III)* (see note 12 above), 137–138.
53. *Ibid.*, 137–138.
54. Arrêté du gouverneur général, 16 August 1841, reproduced in Ringel (see note 46 above), 24.
55. *The United Service Magazine*, 1852, vol. 68, January–April, 97.
56. P. Wachi, "Les Affaires Indigènes," *Revue tunisienne* 8 (1901), 198.
57. Hugonnet (see note 19 above), 188.
58. Hubert Lyautey, *Vers le Maroc: lettres du Sud-Oranais, 1903–1906* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1937), 53.
59. Tocqueville (see note 31 above), 80, footnote.
60. Lyautey (see note 58 above), 70.
61. The initially quoted collective review also reviewed Borrer. Anonymous (see note 1 above).
62. Borrer (see note 19 above), 109–110.
63. See for instance M. Martin, *Historique du 2e régiment de tirailleurs algériens* (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1894).
64. Anthony Thrall Sullivan, *Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, France and Algeria 1784–1849* (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1983), 127–132.
65. Paul Gaffarel, *L'Algérie: histoire, conquête et colonisation* (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1883), 238.
66. Anonymous witness, quoted in *Ibid.*, 239.
67. *Ibid.*, 238.
68. Quoted in Everard Clive, "The Caves of Dahra and Military Atrocities," *Bentley's Miscellany* 20 (January 1846): 209–212, 211. Clive was so outraged by the events in Dahra that he expressed an Englishman's pride that "his language has no equivalent for 'razzia.'"
69. See for instance Heinzelmann (see note 19 above), 23. On removing the manure, see the memoirs of a former captain in the foreign legion Bamberg (see note 16 above), 175.
70. Heinrich von Maltzan, *Drei Jahre im Nordwesten von Afrika* (Leipzig: Dürsches Buchhandlung, 1863), 147.
71. Immanuel Hermann Fichte, *System der Ethik* (Leipzig: Dyk, 1850), 349.
72. Sullivan (see note 64 above), 128.
73. *Ibid.*, 128.
74. Saint-Arnaud, quoted in *Ibid.*, 130.
75. Bugeaud, quoted in *Ibid.*, 131.
76. Wachi (see note 56 above), 198.
77. Montagnac, quoted in Sullivan (see note 64 above), 130.
78. James Dodsley, *Annual Register: History and Politics of the Year 1845* (London: Rivington, 1846), 146–147.
79. Alfred François Nettelement, *Histoire de la conquête de l'Algérie* (Paris: Jacques Lecoffre, 1870), 214, footnote 1.
80. Eugène Daumas, *La vie arabe* (Paris: Michel Lévy, 1869), 482.
81. For a more detailed analysis of how French doctrinal thought was carried into the twenty-first century, see Thomas Rid, "The 19th Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine," *Journal of Strategic Studies* (2010, forthcoming).