Cyber War Will Not Take Place

by Thomas Rid on 10 March 2013

Rid, T. Cyber War Will Not Take Place, London: Hurst/Oxford University Press (2013) 256p 

‘This book will be welcomed by all those who have struggled to get the measure of the “cyber war” threat. As Thomas Rid takes on the digital doomsters he also provides a comprehensive, authoritative and sophisticated analysis of the strategic quandaries created by new technologies.’
Sir Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies, King’s College London and author of Strategy: A History

‘Thomas Rid provides an unusually level-headed view of where we are in the cyber arms race. This book nips in the bud the loose talk of cyber war and illustrates what’s really happening. Anyone involved in building defences against future attacks should read this book first.’
Mikko Hypponen, virus analyst and Chief Research Officer, F-Secure 

‘We’re in the early years of a cyber war arms race, one fuelled both by fear and ignorance. This book is a cogent counterpoint to both the doomsayers and profiteers, and should be required reading for anyone concerned about our national security policy in cyberspace.’
Bruce Schneier, security guru and author of Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust Society Needs to Thrive

‘With news of cyber war, terrorism and espionage seemingly everywhere, separating hype from reality is not always easy. Many agencies and companies stand to gain by inflating cyber security fears. Thomas Rid takes a razor to the evidence and carefully dissects the evolution of conflict and espionage in the cyber age. The result is a compelling and authoritative take on war and strategy in cyberspace, one that will surely be seminal in this area for years to come.’
Ronald J. Deibert, Citizen Lab Director, Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto and author of Black Code: Inside the Battle for Cyberspace

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‘Cyber war is coming,’ announced a landmark RAND report in 1993. In 2005, the U.S. Air Force boasted it would now fly, fight, and win in cyberspace, the ‘fifth domain’ of warfare. This book takes stock, twenty years on: is cyber war really coming? Has war indeed entered the fifth domain?

Cyber War Will Not Take Place cuts through the hype and takes a fresh look at cyber security. Thomas Rid argues that the focus on war and winning distracts from the real challenge of cyberspace: non-violent confrontation that may rival or even replace violence in surprising ways.

The threat consists of three different vectors: espionage, sabotage, and subversion. The author traces the most significant hacks and attacks, exploring the full spectrum of case studies from the shadowy world of computer espionage and weaponised code. With a mix of technical detail and rigorous political analysis, the book explores some key questions: What are cyber weapons? How have they changed the meaning of violence? How likely and how dangerous is crowd-sourced subversive activity? Why has there never been a lethal cyber attack against a country’s critical infrastructure? How serious is the threat of ‘pure’ cyber espionage, of exfiltrating data without infiltrating humans first? And who is most vulnerable: which countries, industries, individuals?

Advance coverage

Interview, 2.34 mins, BBC Today, Radio 4, 13 March 2013

Interview (mp3, 6.36 mins), Deutschlandradio Kultur, 4 February 2013

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Deterrence Beyond the State

by Thomas Rid on 13 April 2012

Rid, T (2012) “Deterrence Beyond the State. The Israeli Experience” Contemporary Security Policy, April, vol 33,
iss 1,  p. 124-147, DOI:10.1080/13523260.2012.659593

Israel’s experience with deterrence is unique: it is older, more diverse, and more experimental than that of any other state. How did Israel’s strategy of deterrence evolve? How was it adapted to fit the non-state threat? And what is its utility? This article argues that Israel’s experience with deterrence beyond the state can best be understood through the conceptual lenses provided by the other grand deterrence debate, that in the philosophy of law, not international relations. Israel’s use of military force against non-state enemies doesn’t fit the classic concepts of strategy: it is not just one act of force to compel one actor to fulfill one specific political goal at one given time; deterrence consists of a series of acts of force to create — and maintain — general norms of behavior for many political actors over an extended period of time. Using force, consequently, doesn’t represent a principal failure of deterrence but its maintenance through swift, certain, but measured responses. The inquiry concludes by identifying the method’s limitations.

Deterrence is as old as fear. Punishing offenders is a common theme in the Bible. Threatening potential aggressors with costly consequences has been a subject of political philosophy for centuries, especially in the theory of law. Yet in the history of strategy and international relations, deterrence received remarkably little attention before the mid 20th century. None of the masters of strategy of the 19th century has left much worthy of note about the age-old practice of administering threats by military means. Only in the Cold War were deterrence and retaliation explored in theory and elevated to policy. ‘The twentieth century is not the first century in which “retaliation” has been part of our strategy’, observed Thomas Schelling in the 1960s, ‘but it is the first in which we have systematically recognized it.’ [...]

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Covered by

Deterrence — The Israeli Experience” (27min) War Studies Podcast, 18 March 2012

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Cyber-Weapons

by Thomas Rid on 29 February 2012

Rid, T and P McBurney (2012) "Cyber-Weapons" The RUSI Journal, vol 157, iss 1, February, 6-13, DOI:10.1080/03071847.2012.664354 

What are cyber-weapons? Instruments of code-borne attack span a wide spectrum, from generic but low-potential tools to specific but high-potential weaponry. This distinction brings into relief a two-pronged hypothesis that stands in stark contrast to some of the received wisdom on cyber-security. Maximising the destructive potential of a cyber-weapon is likely to come with a double effect: it will significantly increase the resources, intelligence and time required for development and deployment – and more destructive potential is likely to decrease the number of targets, the risk of collateral damage and the political utility of cyber-weapons.

In the days and hours leading up to the afternoon of 19 March 2011, air force planners in France, Britain, and several other NATO countries were frantically preparing an imminent bombing campaign against military targets in Libya. In Washington on that same March weekend an unusual discussion took place between the Department of Defense and the White House. Should America deploy its cyber arsenal against Libya’s air defence system? After the Pentagon’s generals and geeks had briefed the president on the options, he decided that, No, the time was not ripe for cyber weapons.

The behind-the-scenes episode is part of a much larger debate about offensive cyber weapons. [...]

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“Ansteckende Neugier,” Der Spiegel, 23/2012, p. 124

BBC Radio 5, 31 May 2012

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RUSI podcast, 23 April 2012

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On Cyberwar HypeSchneier on Security, 14 March 2012

What are Cyber Weapons?Infosec Island, 14 March 2012, reposted from Cyber Arms

Radio interview (7.47min), Monocle 24, 6 March 2012

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Why Anonymous will never be able to take down the power grid,” Jerry Brito, 27 February 2012

The cyber-weapons paradox,” The Register, 24 February 2012

 

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Think Again: Cyberwar

by Thomas Rid on 27 February 2012

Rid, T (2012) "Think Again: Cyberwar" Foreign Policy, March/April, p. 58-61

Don’t fear the digital bogeyman. Virtual conflict is still more hype than reality.

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战争2.0

by Thomas Rid on 7 November 2011

War 2.0 is available in paperback in Chinese, published by the People’s Liberation Army Press.

战争2.0 信息时代的非常规战, 托马斯 里德 (作者), 马克 海克 (作者), 金苗 (译者), 出版社: 解放军出版社; 第1版 (2011年5月1日), 302页

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